Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the president of Turkey, began his legitimate political career at the turn of this century with a push for more political pluralism in a Turkey that had long been dominated by an elite, secular military.
Now that he has won another term, Erdogan’s rise as an authoritarian strong man is a key lesson to America about how Trump could move the US in a similar direction. Trump’s antics on racism and immigration have distracted the American public from the massive numbers of federal judgeships Mitch McConnell is allowing Trump to fill with far right ideologues, after having blocked or run the clock out on Obama appointees. Trump is in a position to shape the officer corps, ensuring that fellow travelers of John Kelly and Jim Mattis take control. Trump is attempting to create public distrust of the print and broadcast media, substituting what is virtually Trump Administration t.v. over at Fox as well as far, far right kooks on the internet like the Breitbar crew and Alex Jones. Trump strongly allied with the Christian religious Right, who are his most reliable constituency. All of these steps were taken by Erdogan, as well, and over time they created an elective dictatorship where civil society is often just banned and there is no free press.
Turkey had had elections from 1950, but its politics were carefully circumscribed to the center-right and center-left. About once a decade the military made a coup, trying to destroy the political left and unions, in which it succeeded by the 1990s. The elite also excluded the Muslim religious Right from legitimate politics, fearing that it would appeal to people in farming towns in the countryside, then the majority of the population, and so would prove able to marginalize the urban, modern, educated elite. When a man of the religious Right became prime minister in 1997, the military shut him down.
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Erdogan had those religious Right leanings, but seemed genuinely, once his party began winning elections in 2002, to want more pluralism for Turkey. His party championed joining Europe in hopes that European human rights law would force the Turkish secular elite to relinquish some power and allow his Justice and Development Party freely to contest elections.
Erdogan’s party reached out to Turkey’s beleaguered Kurdish minority, many of whom were rural and religiously conservative. Its increasing popularity made it possible for Erdogan to forestall any further military coups and to break the power of the secular, arrogant officer corps. He allied with the right wing religious cult, the Gulen Movement, using it to win parliamentary seats and constituencies he might not have won on his own, at least initially.
And then, having regularly won elections, Erdogan abandoned his earlier commitments to pluralism and adopted an increasingly strident rhetoric. His party, once the victim of judicial politics and authoritarian plotting, became increasingly intolerant. He shut down the Gezi Park youth movement in 2013, insisting that civil society activism is illegal and interpreting Turkey’s elections as electoral dictatorship (i.e. rulers are elected but then after the election the voters just go back to being sheep who should do as they are told). His ability to instruct the Turkish media not to even cover the protests about turning Gezi Park into a mall (Erdogan is all about malls and mosques, mosques and malls) revealed for the first time how limited had been Turkey’s baby steps toward democracy.
In 2015, a new, pro-Kurdish party emerged, the Democratic Peoples’ Party, which managed to get some 13% of seats in parliament and to steal voters away from Justice and Development. It reduced Erdogan’s party to only about 42%, and interfered with Erdogan’s plans for one-party rule and for major constitutional changes to make Turkey a presidential system akin to Putin’s Russia.
Personally, I think Erdogan deliberately went to war with the Kurds in order to polarize the country and to discredit the Democratic Peoples’ Party. The radical Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) did supply him with a pretext, in attacking Turkish police and soldiers, but it is laughable to identify the civil Democratic Peoples’ Party with the PKK, as he essentially did. He gradually had that party’s leaders arrested for being pro-Kurdish or just for defying Erdogan. One of them ran for president against him from jail. A hung parliament allowed him to call snap elections later that year (2015), in which his party won a bare majority and so had the way clear to change the constitution.